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CONCERNING FRIENDLY FIRES
ROBERT M. MORRISON *
In nature, there is no such thing as a "friendly" fire. Fire is a
destructive process, changing the substances involved into something
different. When caged and controlled, its effects can be limited to
those materials which are subjected to it. Under such conditions, the
energy, which is a by-product of the process, can be put to useful ends.
To gain these desired ends, fire has been introduced into human
habitations and structures, but it has never been domesticated. Man
cages it but ever fears it.
Apparently, the term "friendly" fire was the brain child of Justice
Knowlton of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court at the end of
the nineteenth century. 1 It and its companion term, "hostile" fire,
were coined in connection with a suit upon a standard fire insurance
policy for a loss resulting from the ignition of soot in a chimney. The
court held: "A fire in a chimney should be considered rather a hostile
fire than a friendly fire, and as such, if it causes damage, it is within
the provisions of ordinary contracts of fire insurance."' Endowing
each fire with a personality and character of its own seemed to appeal
to the romantic spirit of the times, and these terms were widely
adopted by other courts. They have now become entrenched in the
lexicon of insurance law. 3 This development has not been without
resistance. In the years that have intervened, judges and textwriters
alike have squirmed and wriggled within the subjective confines of
these terms, seeking to escape from a restrictive interpretation that
seemed contrary to the general intention of purchasers of fire in-
surance policies.4
Some limit must be put upon the meaning of the words "loss by
fire" as used in a policy of fire insurance. The post-prandial cigar is
obviously consumed by fire and, just as obviously, economic loss
attends the pleasure derived therefrom. The fuel used to heat our
homes is consumed by fire and valuable materials are destroyed in
the process. No one would question the fact that such losses lie outside
the coverage of a fire insurance policy. It is equally certain that when
Dr. Nicolas Barbon, in the year 1667, opened his office in London
* A.B. 1924, LL.B. 1927, Harvard University; C.P.C.U. 1959; Partner in the firm
of Morrison, Mahoney & Miller, Boston; President, The School of Insurance, In-
corporated.
1 Way v. Abington Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 166 Mass, 67, 43 N.E. 1032 (1896).
2 Id. at 74-75, 43 N.E. at 1033-34.
8 29A Am. Jur. Insurance 1287 (1960).
4 Vance, Friendly Fires, 1 Conn. D.J. 284 (1927).
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offering "insurance against loss to dwellings and business buildings by
fire," he had in mind the damage wrought by the Great Fire of London
the preceding year, and contemplated coverage against the destruction
of buildings by an uncontrollable conflagration.'
The first case which made any attempt to distinguish between
these two extremes did not appear in the judicial reports until one
hundred and fifty years after Barbon's venture.° This was the case
of Austin v. Drewe decided in 1817 by Chief Justice Gibbs.' From
the various reports of that case, it appears that smoke and heat from
a processing fire on the insured's premises, which normally would pass
out through the chimney, were, through the negligence of the insured's
servants, discharged into the storage rooms where they caused damage
to the insured's property, The court had to determine whether this
was a loss covered under the insured's fire policy. The decision was
in favor of the insurer. It was based upon the conclusion that the
fire which created the smoke and heat was not a "fire" within the
meaning of that word as it appeared in the insurance policy.
In the years that have intervened, attention has been directed
again and again to the decision in Austin v. Drewe, and the report
has been thoroughly dissected in search of authority to govern new
factual situations. That case served in large measure as the anvil
upon which, some eighty years later, Justice Knowlton hammered
out his concept of "friendly" and "hostile" fires.'
Thirty-five years ago, Professor William R. Vance, returning to
the language of the Gibbs' decision, found in it a new criterion to be
applied in determining whether or not a fire was covered under a
policy.° To the criteria theretofore accepted by the great majority of
jurisdictions, which excluded coverage if a fire was "friendly," i.e.,
when it was intentionally set and confined to the place where it was
intended to be, Vance added a third requirement, namely, that the
fire must not be excessive. Such a requirement would shift many fires
which had been held "friendly" to the ranks of "hostile" fires and
would, in Vance's opinion, more nearly meet the probable intention
of the parties to the contract." This proposed change in criteria was
15 Mehr and Cammack, Principles of Insurance 782 (rev. ed. 1957).
6 It is difficult to believe that the meaning of the term "fire" had not been passed
upon by a judicial tribunal during this period; nevertheless, no reference to such a
case has been found in any of the reported decisions.
7 4 Camp. 360, Holt N.P. 126, 2 Marsh 130, 6 Taunt. 436, 128 Eng. Rep. 1104
(1817).
8 Way v. Abington Mutual Fire Ins. Co., supra note 1.
9 Vance, supra note 4.
10 Id. at 293. Vance hoped that "the doctrine of the 'friendly' fire may be shrunk
to the original form given it by Chief Justice Gibbs. . . ." In none of the reports of
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accepted with enthusiasm last year by the Supreme Court of Minne-
sota in the case of L. L. Freeberg Pie Co. v. St. Paul Mutual Insurance
Co." That court, citing the Vance article, held "contrary to the great
majority of decided cases" that the excessiveness of the fire, even
though confined to the place where it was intended to be, changed it
from a "friendly" to a "hostile" fire."
Although the first one hundred and fifty years after Barbon
produced only one reported case which attempted to categorize the
kind of fire covered under a fire insurance policy, the next one hundred
and fifty years produced many decisions which wrestled with this
problem." After 1896, most of these cases adopted the nomenclature
coined by Justice Knowlton. A reading of these decisions leaves one
with the strong suspicion that this romantically oriented terminology
has served to blur rather than to clarify. Judges tend to hide behind
the words and declare with resignation that "though the present
distinction [between "hostile" and "friendly" fires] may seem arbi-
trary, yet it is of long standing, makes for certainty in the ascertain-
ment of rights, and has been acted upon in the writing of so vast a
number of insurance contracts throughout this country that its sound-
ness may not, at this time, be questioned.'
Today, almost forty years after that statement was penned, it is
still doubtful that a frontal attack on the use of the established
terminology would meet with any great success, notwithstanding the
merit of such an attack. So too, the fact that society has evolved from
a romantic into a scientific era would not seem to have seriously
undermined so well settled a usage. It is probable that the terms
"friendly" and "hostile" will be used for many years to come. Nothing,
however, prevents an attempt to re-examine and redefine the scope of
these terms. The continued discomfiture experienced by courts in
applying these terms, as presently defined, sounds a warning that
should not be ignored.
One cannot be oblivious to the trend in judicial circles to apply,
the case is that term used by Gibbs nor is there any implication that he considered
the fire in any way "friendly."
11 257 Minn. 244, 100 N.W.2d 753 (1960).
12 For one reaction to this decision, see Note, Hostility Toward the "Hostile Fire"
Doctrine, 6 S.D.L. Rev. 129 (1961), where the author concluded that "by attempting
to alter the 'hostile' and 'friendly' distinction, the court has created an exception even
more illogical than the rule itself. It is doubtful that this decision will be widely
followed." (The title is refreshing; most hostility is expressed toward the "friendly"
fire doctrine.)
13 See cases cited in Vance, Insurance 869-871 (3rd ed. 1951), and in 5 Appleman,
Insurance Law and Practice § 3082 (1941).
14 Justice Haines, speaking for the court, in Lavitt v. Hartford County Mutual
Fire Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 729, 736, 136 AU. 572, 575 (1927).
17
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
in a very literal sense, the classic definition of insurance as a "social
device designed for the spread of loss." Thus, in removing the mantle
of charitable immunity from hospitals and other charitable insti-
tutions, courts have been influenced by the fact that liability insurance
is generally available to spread the resulting loss throughout the
social structure.' In the light of such developments, it is not entirely
unexpected that a rigorous attempt might be made to attack the
defense barriers raised by insurers against the imposition of liability
under their contracts of fire insurance. Included among these defenses
is that of the "friendly" fire. Existing, as it does, as an implied
limitation not spelled out in a policy and running, as it does, contrary
to the popular desire to have all loss compensated by insurance,
Justice Knowlton's terminology can turn into a trap wherein the sound
legal principles involved may be lost. An examination into and a
restatement of the legal principles inherent in the proposition that
lass caused by some fires cannot be recovered under a fire insurance
policy is very much in order. That is the task to which the balance
of this article is directed." If, out of deference to long established
custom, the old labels of "friendly" and "hostile" are reattached to
such newly formulated analysis, no serious objection need be raised.
In an age when science reigns supreme, it may not be amiss to
explore briefly some of the technical aspects of the phenomenon we
call "fire." By accepted definition, "fire" is "the principle of com-
bustion as manifested in light [and heat], especially flame."" Al-
though the term "combustion" may be applied to any chemical
process, it is used in the present context to denote the union of two
or more substances. In the course of such union, not only are fresh
substances produced, but energy is transferred. Some combustion
requires the addition of energy to produce the new substance, while
in other combustion, energy is given off. The latter type is called
"exothermic" combustion.' Fire is a combustion of this type, usually
resulting from the union of oxygen with another substance. The most
obvious and visible signs of the production of energy are the emission
15 See President and Dir. of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 823-24
(D.C. Cir. 1942); Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162,
172, 260 P.2d 765, 771 (1953) ; Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 475,
135 N.E.2d 410, 415 (1956); Kojis v. Doctors Hospital, 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W.2d
131, 134 (1961).
10 The author has never forgotten the suggestion of a Massachusetts Superior
Court judge that, once every forty years, precedent should be disregarded and rules
of law submitted to the highest state court for reconsideration.
17 Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1955).
is Details concerning combustion are taken principally from Cameron, Chemistry
in Relation to Fire Risk and Fire Extinction (3rd ed. 1948).
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of heat and light. If the union of the two substances takes place
slowly, as in the oxidation or rusting of iron, the heat is produced very
slowly and is dissipated without the molecules of the substances being
strongly excited. Where the union or combustion takes place rapidly,
the heat has little chance to be dissipated and the temperature of the
substance is raised. The effect of heating a substance is to throw
its molecules into motion or vibration, or to increase the amount of
motion. This motion can be transferred into other substances, thereby
transferring heat. The transfer of heat can produce a whole gamut of
results, from warming, through blistering and charring, to ignition of
the other substances. When molecules are excited beyond a certain
point, part of their motion is reflected as a glow or incandescence.
Thus, in the process of combustion, the heightened temperature may
convert some of the substances involved into a gaseous state. If this
gas is energized to a point where it begins to glow, we have a flame.
Flame is thus a glowing gas.
It has been established by judicial decision that, in order for a
combustion to be considered a "fire" within the meaning of a fire
insurance policy, the reaction must be violent enough to produce a
visible flame or glow." This ties in with the aforementioned dictionary
definition of "fire" as "the principle of combustion as manifested in
light [and heat], especially flame."" Thus, the word "fire" is, by its
very definition, a relative and not an absolute term. It refers to a
combustion that has reached a certain degree of intensity. Short of
that degree, the damage caused by the process of combustion is not
damage by fire. It has been held that heat and light are not fire; 21
they are only visible signs that the process of combustion is proceeding
at a degree of intensity which brings it within the context of the
insurance policy. Certainly, once the heat is removed from intimate
contact with the substances involved in the combustion, it can no
longer be considered fire, any more than can the smoke which is given
off or the ashes which remain.
19 Western Woolen Mill Co. v. Northern Assur. Co., 139 Fed. 637 (8th Cir.
1905). Huebner, Property Insurance 148 (1938). The introduction of so-called "all
risk" policies creates an entirely new situation, depending on policy exclusions. Such
a situation is beyond the scope of this article.
20 Webster, op. cit. supra note 17. It seems clear that the Minnesota Court was
technically on unsound ground in the use it made of the definition of the word "burn"
as given in Webster's Dictionary. "Burn" can mean to be on fire; it can also mean
to be charred, scorched, scalded, withered, etc., by the action of fire or heat. It is
misleading to cite this as authority for the statement that "burn and char are held to
be synonymous" and then go on to hold that the capacity to burn has escaped from
the place where the flames were confined and hence we have a "hostile" fire where
charring only took place.
21 Lavitt v. Hartford County Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 105 Conn. 729, 136 Atl. 572
(1927).
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It is this chemical reaction that man has introduced into his
environment for his comfort and use, conscious of the fact that it is
in the nature of the energy produced to involve any substance which
it can reach by conduction or radiation. To prevent the involvement
of additional materials, the reaction is contained by appropriate
measures. Sometimes the measures are inadequate and other materials
become involved in the process of combustion and are destroyed.
This is a peril inherent in the very nature of fire. 22 Insurance offers
protection against the risk of loss from this peril.
Insurance is a social device designed to offset the risk or un-
certainty that a particular peril will result in loss to the individual,
loss being the unintentional decline in or disappearance of values
arising from a contingency." A basic concept of insurance is that,
for a risk to be insurable, the occurrence of the loss in any individual
case must be accidental or fortuitous. Thus, insurance against the
peril of fire rests on the principle that, as to any individual insured,
the involvement of his property in the process of combustion must be
accidental or fortuitous."
Supporting this concept of accident or chance in the occurrence
of loss is the principle that a policy of insurance is a contract in-
volving the utmost good faith. 25 Any act of the insured which affects
the operation of chance, any act which intentionally brings about the
happening of the peril, removes the uncertainty which is the essence
of risk, and destroys the foundation upon which the contract was
based. Professor Vance, in his book on insurance, states: "The
[insurance] contract does not contemplate granting indemnity for a
loss which is due to the intentional act of the insured, for one of the
requisites of insurance is that the risk shall not be subject in any wise
to the control of the parties."' Similarly, Ackerman explains: "If
the loss results from an intentional act of the insured, there is usually
22 The containment may be total, as in an incinerator; partial, as in a fireplace;
or achieved merely by separation, as in an outdoor rubbish fire. Society is now attempt-
ing to cope with the danger of energy given off by nuclear fission and fusion. Since this
is not a process of combustion involving molecules, the process which produces this
energy is not a fire.
23 Mehr and Cammack, op. cit. supra note 5, at 24a.
24 Mehr and Cammack, op. cit. supra note 5, at 36-38. In enlarging the concept
of accident, in connection with accident insurance, it has been held that where acts are
done as intended and yet produce injury because of the unknown existence of some
condition which materially changes the consequences of the act, the result is un-
doubtedly unexpected and accidental, that is, the injury resulting from the intended act
is accidental. The resultant fire is to be equated with such resultant injury.
25 1%16r and Cammack, op. cit. supra note 5, at 124.
20 Vance, op. cit. supra note 13, at 90.
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no liability under the contract—the loss must be contingent upon some
scientifically measurable element of chance." 27
When an insured starts a fire, be it • in his furnace, stove, in-
cinerator or at the end of his cigarette, he has intentionally set in
motion the process or reaction that will destroy the materials involved;
he has violated the insurance principle; and he has removed any loss
that may result from this destruction from the realm of his policy
coverage. 28
Under most circumstances, knowledge on the part of the insurer
that the insured is intentionally causing losses by the peril insured
against, even though no claim is being made therefor, would result
in an immediate cancellation of the policy. If fire insurance were
treated in this manner, an impossible situation would result. As noted
earlier, it is common knowledge that any insured will be continuously
destroying materials through combustion—in his .furnace, stove, in-
cinerator, etc. Such fires are the very peril insured against under his
fire insurance policy, and the insurer's knowledge of their existence
would make it impossible to procure insurance coverage. Fortunately,
fire insurance rests upon a slightly different basis. This daily de-
struction by fire is accepted, and the concept of hazard is utilized in
order to determine whether the restraints upon the destructive process
are sufficient, in form and intent. If the hazard is properly measured
by the rate, the insurance company will "accept the risk.""
Thus, a policy against loss or damage by fire is issued even
though the insurer knows that the insured will frequently destroy
materials by fire. Such destruction will not be a "loss" under the
policy because it is not an "unintentional destruction of value arising
from a contingency." Moreover, any losses which flow directly from
such an intentional fire will not be covered under the policy, whether
they result from heat or smoke produced by the fire, or from water
used to extinguish it."
As stated, in order to constitute a "fire" within the coverage
of a policy of fire insurance, two requirements must be satisfied.
First, there must be an actual burning, evidenced by a visible flame
27 Ackerman, Insurance 543 (1938).
Zs Bament, What is a Fire Loss?—The Fire Insurance Contract 250-274 (The
Insurance Society of New York 1922). The destruction of huts by fire to produce
roast pig, as described so delightfully by Charles Lamb, is an excellent case in point,
albeit an imaginary one.
29 Mehr and Cammack, op. cit. supra note 5, at 22.
30 Huebner, op. cit. supra note 19, at 139.
31 Supra note 19.
21
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or glow.' Secondly, the fire must be, as far as the insured is concerned,
accidental in its origin."
The second requisite, if taken literally, would appear to rule
out all damage, however caused, which results, through an unbroken
chain, from a fire intentionally set by the insured. Such a fire could
never be considered accidental in its origin, and if the combustion
should spread to include additional materials, the nature of the fire's
origin would remain unchanged. This requirement would also appear
to exclude many losses which the parties to the insurance contract
certainly intended to cover."
Once again, the unusual nature of the situation must be taken
into consideration. Just as both insured and insurer impliedly accept
the fact that intentional destruction by fire is a necessary and expected
part of the insured's daily activities, and that any losses caused
thereby are not within the meaning of the words "loss by fire," so it
is impliedly accepted by both parties that, at some point in the chain
of causation, damage resulting from a fire intentionally set will come
within the meaning of those words as used in the fire insurance policy.
In other words, some limit must be placed upon the extent to which
the original .intention to start the combustion will bar recovery. The
problem is where to draw the line so that, for purposes of the fire
insurance contract, the intent to destroy property will be deemed to
have ceased, and any destruction thereafter caused will be considered
within the scope of the policy's coverage. This is the problem that
Justice Knowlton was dealing with when he invented the terms
"hostile" and "friendly"; this is the problem that is being reconsidered
in this article.
What should be deemed the intention of an insured when he
starts the process of combustion? The measures taken to confine the
reaction may sometimes be considered in determining what results
the insured expected to flow from the process of combustion which he
has started. There are also certain consequences which, it can be said,
he must have expected, or must be charged with having expected.
Thus, he must have anticipated that the process of combustion would
82 Supra notes 24-28.
33 Vance, op. cit. supra note 13, at 867, writes "The rule that the law looks at
the proximate and not the remote cause of an injury applies as well to the law of
insurance as to the law of torts . . . [except that] the insurer is responsible for loss
directly caused by fire, even though the fire may have been due to the negligence of
the insured or of some third party; that is, even though negligence on the part of the
plaintiff or his agent may have been the original cause of the loss." See also 5 Apple-
man, op, cit. supra note 13, at § 3083. This article deals with the loss resulting from
a fire intentionally set by the insured. It would seem that the exception referred to
above should also include many of the losses so caused.
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follow from his acts; that the process would destroy the substances
involved in the reaction; that energy would be given off in the form
of heat; and that this energy would tend to involve in the reaction
all additional materials to which it might be transferred by conduction
or radiation. These results are so closely related to the intentional acts
of the insured that recovery for losses caused thereby would clearly
violate the fundamental principle of insurance that a loss must be
fortuitous to be compensable. 84 There is a point, however, where the
results flowing from an intentional combustion are sufficiently different
from what was expected or intended so that allowance of recovery
under a fire insurance policy would in no way be contrary to any of
the basic principles of insurance.
Although any consideration of intention or expectation involves
delving into the realm of the subjective, 35 certain standards are
available to assist the trier of fact in reaching a satisfactory decision.
These standards are formulated by considering the results of a
particular case in relation to the environment in which the insured is
operating.
The first of these standards may be described as the spatial
relationship. Within what space does the insured expect or intend
that the fire should burn? This is a familiar standard, long recognized
by the courts. It has formed the basis of the vast majority of cases
that have dealt with "friendly" and "hostile" fires." The insured
expects that the process of combustion will take place within certain
limits. As long as .the fire remains within these limits, the resulting
loss cannot be recovered under an insurance policy. When the fire
breaks its bonds and extends beyond the place where the insured
intended it should burn, the resultant loss is recoverable.
When an insured starts a fire in his incinerator, it is held to be
his intention that everything in the incinerator will be involved in the
fire. Although he may not know specifically what is inside the in-
cinerator, his spatial intention is clear. If, unknown to him, an item
such as valuable jewelry has been deposited in the incinerator, his
34 Supra notes 24-28.
35 In Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 54, 120 N.E. 86, 88
(1918), Cardozo, J. stated: "In last analysis, therefore, it is something in the minds of
men, in the will of the contracting parties, and not merely in the physical bond of union
between events, which solves, at least for the jurist, this problem of causation." One ques-
tion not dealt with in this article is the standard to be used in determining the exact na-
ture of the intention with which the insured is to be charged. A purely subjective test
could be applied, seeking to determine what each individual insured had in mind. On the
other hand, an objective test could be applied, such as that used in actions based on
negligence.
36 See cases cited in Vance, op. cit. supra note 13, and in 5 Appleman, op. cit.
supra note 13.
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intention extends to this item, and no recovery for its loss can be had
under his fire insurance policy.37 Conversely, under the spatial re-
lationship the insured does not intend to have a fire outside of his
incinerator. If material outside does catch fire from the combustion
within, the result is unexpected, and hence any loss flowing from such
an outside fire is recoverable."
Just what constitutes the space within which the insured intended
the fire to burn is a question of fact. In Way v. Abington Mutual Fire
Insurance Co.," a chimney was considered a different space from the
stove to which it was attached. Loss from a fire in the chimney, due
to the ignition of soot therein, was held to be within the scope of the
policy and therefore compensable. Where, because of lack of water,
the container itself becomes involved in the process of combustion, the
problem is also one of a spatial relationship. It must be expected that
the intimate contact of the container with the materials being con-
sumed within it will involve the container in the process of com-
bustion. 4°
In Johnson v. Berkshire Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,' the
Massachusetts Supreme Court stretched the spatial relationship there
involved to its conceivable limits. In that case, the insured tried to
get bees from under the door of his barn by smoking them out with a
wisp of straw. The barn caught on fire and burned. The court held
that the insured's conduct was simply negligent, and not so reckless
and willful as to constitute bad faith. The court evidently limited the
spatial intention of the insured to the wisp of straw, and felt that the
structure of the barn was not expected to be involved in the burning.
Because of the general acceptance of the spatial standard, even
though it may not be dealt with specifically as such, it should not be
necessary to elaborate further on this relationship. It should be
pointed out, however, that, with rare exception, the courts have failed
to recognize any relationship other than spatial. This failure on the
37 Weiner v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 124 Misc. 153, 207 N.Y. Supp. 279
(1924), aff'd, 214 App. Div. 784, 210 N.Y. Supp. 935 (1925); Harter v. Phoenix Ins.
Co., 257 Mich. 163, 241 N.W. 196 (1932). Contra: Salmon v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co.,
161 So. 340 (La. App. 1935). It is immaterial whether the loss resulted from burning
or damage by heat.
88 Way v. Abington Mut. Fire Ins Co., supra note 1; Pappadakis v. Netherlands ,
Fire & Life Ins. Co., 137 Wash. 430, 242 Pac. 641 (1926).
89 Supra note 1.
4(1 Wasserman v. Caledonian-American Ins. Co., 326 Mass. 518, 95 N.E.2d 547
(1950). But see Progress Laundry and Cleaning Co. v. Reciprocal Exchange, 109
S.W.2d 226 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937), where the court divided the boiler into two
separate containers, from one of which the fire was intended to be excluded, and
damage to which was therefore held to be within the coverage of the fire policy.
41 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 388 (1862).
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part of the courts has resulted in an undesirably narrow view on the
question of what losses are recoverable under a fire insurance policy.
The almost apologetic analyses which periodically emanate from
judges and textwriters alike may, in turn, be traced to this restricted
outlook.42
Yet, if one is dealing with subjective intent and expectation, it
is submitted that there are at least two other relationships equally
appropriate as standards to aid the trier of fact in its quest for a
more satisfactory solution to this problem. Adoption of these "ad-
ditional" standards would be but a recognition of the fact that there
are other situations in which the results of combustion also exceed
the expectation or intention of the insured when he initiated the
process. Their adoption would also serve to clarify the issues involved
in this problem, by enabling courts to place their decisions upon a
more substantial basis than is presently afforded by recourse to
exceptions. The process of change would be more a transition than a
revolution since these "additional" relationships can be easily fitted
within the framework of the established terminology, and are in no
way contrary to accepted insurance principles.
The first of these newly formulated standards may be described
as the temporal relationship. The insured expects or intends a fire to
burn for a certain length of time and then cease, for example, where it
is expected that a fuel pump will shut off at a certain hour, or that a
thermostatic control will stop the process of combustion when the
heat has reached a specified temperature. It would seem that the
intention of the insured in such cases (that the process of combustion
should be contained within these temporal relationships) is just as
clear, definite and determinable as in the case of the spatial relation-
ship. If, for reasons beyond the control of the insured, the process of
combustion extends beyond the time controls set for it, and damage
by fire results, the insured should be permitted to recover for his loss
under his fire insurance policy.
Such recovery would not be based upon a change of fire insurance
principles, for example, by permitting recovery for an accidental loss
42 Patterson, for example, has called the spatial relationship the "container"
theory. He writes: "Since most 'friendly' fires are confined to containers, we may define
a 'hostile' fire as one that escapes from the container in which it was started and to
which it is ordinarily confined. . . . While one court has held that any excessively hot
fire that causes damage outside the container (stove or furnace) is covered by the
policy, the argument that the container rule, because of its certainty, will in the long
run avoid wasteful litigation (e.g., to determine what is 'excessive' fire) and thus be
most beneficial to the insuring public has almost universally prevailed." Patterson,
Essentials of Insurance Law 246-47 (2d ed. t957), citing O'Connor v. Queen Ins. Co.,
140 Wis. 388, 122 N.W. 1038 (1909).
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from an intended fire." The loss would simply be one resulting from an
unexpected, unintended and unanticipated fire, burning when (rather
than where) a fire was not expected to be burning. The decision of
the Minnesota Court in L. L. Freeberg Pie Co. v. St. Paul Mutual
Insurance Co." would also be acceptable under such a temporal
relationship standard. It would be unnecessary to carve out an
exception of dubious value. The thermostat in that case was expected
to turn off the fuel when the oven temperature reached 200° F. The
thermostat was defective, and did not shut off the fuel, so that the
temperature rose above 650° F. Substantial damage was done to the
oven and the surrounding structures, but there was no ignition out-
side the oven. Applying the temporal relationship standard to such
facts, however, the fire inside the oven could no longer be considered
intentional when it exceeded the temporal intention of the insured.
The second newly formulated standard may be described as the
potential relationship, referring thereby to the intensity of the
energy given off by the process of combustion. If the energy produc-
ing potential of the materials ignited by the insured differs sub-
stantially from that which he intended, recovery should be allowed
under a fire insurance policy for any resulting loss. Allowance of
recovery under such circumstances would still be in accord with
generally accepted insurance principles.
A simple example of the type of situation in which the potential
standard could be utilized would be a case where damage results
from the insured's inadvertent use of gasoline instead of fuel oil as
the material to be used in the process of combustion. The energy
producing potential of the resulting fire would be entirely different
from anything that the insured can be said to have expected or
intended. It should be noted that it is not the heat or other products
of the fire, but the fire itself, that is different and unexpected. The
nature and characteristics of the fire which actually takes place can-
not be held to have been within the intention of the insured when
he initiated the process of combustion.
A decision which may be considered as falling within this poten-
tial relationship is that of O'Connor v. Queen Insurance Co. 45 In
that case, the insured's servant built a fire in a furnace using cannel
coal, a material not intended for such use. A fire of such fury de-
veloped that the house was filled with great volumes of smoke, soot
and excessive and intense heat. Although there was no ignition out-
43 Supra note 12, at 136.
44 Supra note 11.
45 Supra note 42.
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side the furnace, the court allowed recovery. In its decision, the
court referred to the fact that the materials were unsuited for the
purpose intended, but seemed to place primary reliance upon the
excessiveness of the fire. It held that the rule set forth in Austin v.
Drew e46 did not encompass such excessive fires, and that they were
to be considered "hostile" fires.
As in the Freeberg° case, the O'Connor court seemed satisfied
with an expansion of the term "hostile" sufficient to allow recovery
for so-called "excessive" fires. The use of the word "excessive" offers
no real guide for the solution of the problem which confronts a court
in these cases. In determining whether or not a particular loss is
recoverable under a fire insurance policy, use of the word "excessive"
serves to blur, rather than clarify, the issue. Neither court tells us
exactly when a fire is to be deemed excessive, and yet such a deter-
mination must be made unless we are to struggle anew with the same
problem in each succeeding case.
It is submitted that a fire may properly be considered excessive
only where such a fire exceeds the spatial, temporal or potential
relationships expected or intended by the insured. Use of these
standards will not only allow a court to establish a solid foundation
upon which to place its future decisions, but will also avoid the many
pitfalls inherent in the use of an undefined, and seemingly all-inclu-
sive term."
It is important that a distinction be drawn between a situation
such as that which occurred in the O'Connor case and a situation
where the materials consumed were those intended by the insured, but
where, in the process of combustion, more heat was given off, or was
given off at a faster rate than he had anticipated. The latter situation
could occur when, for example, the dampers in a stove were Ieft
open, thereby allowing a faster inflow of air, carrying the oxygen
which the insured expected to enter into the process of combustion.
In such a case, the entire process of combustion takes place within
the potential relationship which the insured can be held to have
intended. Thus, any loss resulting from the accelerated rate of com-
bustion (of the materials intended to be used by the insured) can
48 Supra note 7.
47 Supra note 11.
48 The term "excessive" would seem to be sufficiently vague so as to allow recovery
for damage resulting from any unexpected amount of heat or smoke, on the ground
that the fire was excessive. Such a result would extend the insurer's liability beyond
a proper limit. In the case of Austin v. Drewe, supra note 7, Gibbs, C. J. does state
that the "fire . . . continued all the time to burn without any excess," but he at no
time specifies to what the excessiveness pertains.
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properly be excluded from recovery." The same result would follow
where the excess heat was produced by the combustible material
which the insured intended to burn, but where a greater amount of
such material was present than the insured realized." •
It would appear, then, that the relationship of today's society
to the peril of fire, always present as a necessary part of the environ-
ment, requires an adjustment in the usual rules of proximate causa-
tion, when deciding whether or not to permit recovery for a loss
under a policy of fire insurance. Although a loss must be fortuitous
to be recoverable, the term "fire" in the fire insurance policy cannot
be limited to fires that are fortuitous in their origin. When a loss,
otherwise not recoverable because the fire is intentional in its origin,
results from a fire that has departed from any one of the environ-
mental relationships, which the insured intended should exist, such a
loss should be compensable." If the fire has remained within all the
intended relationships, the loss should not be recoverable. These
relationships are spatial, temporal and potential, where, when and
how the fire was expected to burn.
The courts have universally allowed recovery in the case of a
spatial variant. The "conflict" and confusion created by the so-
called minority position would in large part be eliminated by the
recognition and acceptance of the temporal and potential variants as
additional standards upon which recovery could be based. Such
recognition would require a reconsideration of the rule of lawu
established in some jurisdictions, but, in view of the basic principles
involved, no violent reversal of position need be anticipated.
It is unfortunate that the terms "friendly" and "hostile," as
presently defined, have come into such wide use, because the former
scarcely conforms to the popular attitude toward a fire which has done
damage to the insured's property. Their continued use in judicial
decisions, however, need not necessarily lead to an improper appli-
cation of insurance principles, if they are applied in the manner sug-
gested, with due regard for the insured's intentions.
49 Hansen v. Lemars Mutual Ins. Ass'n, 193 Iowa 1, 186 N.W. 468 (1922) ; Fitz-
gerald v. German-American Ins. Co., 30 Misc. 72, 62 N.Y. Supp. 824 (1899).
ml American Towing Co. v. German Fire Ins. Co., 74 Md. 25, 21 AtI. 553 (1891).
51 It would seem that only that part of any loss which resulted from a fire beyond
what the insured expected or intended should be recoverable.
52 Professor Vance took the contrary position, that what is involved in these
cases is a rule of construction to determine the probable intention of the parties (in
their use of the words "loss by fire"), rather than a rule of law limiting the insurer's
liability. Vance, supra note 4.
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